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Karl Marx asserted in Capital:  “Force is the midwife of every old society pregnant with a new 
one.  It is itself an economic power.”i  He was referring in particular to the actions taken by the 
state that contributed to the process he termed “the so-called primitive accumulation” in which 
capital and labor initially formed.  In Britain, he addressed enclosure legislation, the vagrancy 
and poor law acts, and wage and anti-combination measures, the whole coercive apparatus that 
laid the infrastructure of capitalism; in the colonies, the expropriation and elimination of 
indigenous peoples in the New World, and the enslavement and transshipment of Africans.  Such 
“brute force,’ Marx affirmed, “employ the power of the State.”    Yet the courts, customs 
collectors and colonial officials constituted but implied threats.  Ultimate force came in the form 
of military and paramilitary action. This paper departs from Marx’s observations to explore the 
army’s role in the transition to capitalism and place state-sponsored armed conflict in the context 
of imperial aggrandizement in the interests of merchant capital.   
The Early Modern era witnessed what historians of warfare have called a military revolution, 
involving relatively swift technological and organizational innovation and marked growth in the 
scale and intensity of armed conflict, developments which had profound implications for both 
state and society.  Often discussed in curiously bloodless terms of military innovation or state 
formation, military revolution actually was part and parcel of the very bloody enterprise of 
primitive accumulation through the pacification of the general populace, the subordination of 
feudal or regional opponents to state power, and the conquest of formerly autonomous states or 
pre-state polities.  Empire comprised the larger theater of military revolution, where imperial 
state formation occurred at the expense of soldiers, indigenous peoples and colonists.  The war 
machine provided the force necessary to the creation of international capital and its protection 
within the imperial sphere.  
Too often warfare is seen as an autonomous process detached from material forces.  There is 
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no doubt that the nature of military conflict stands apart.  Warfare’s disregard for human life 
isolates soldiering as an occupation at the extreme flank of laboring life.  This dependence on 
state-sponsored killing necessitates the legitimization of military conflict in terms religious, 
racial, ethnic and nationalistic. Militarism mystifies itself thus, obscuring the expropriation of 
labor and expenditure of human life to its all too material ends.  War is work.  The paid labor of 
soldiers aggregated contributed directly to the political economic project of the imperial state.  
War assisted in the primitive accumulation of capital requisite to British industrialization, the 
forging of commercial empire, the expropriation or enslavement of indigenous peoples and their 
territories, the international migrations of labor, and the securing of the whole.  Soldiers’ 
Herculean labors must be understood in relation to the experiences of other laborers at this time; 
i.e. in terms of proletarianization, work discipline, class formation and class conflict.  Moreover, 
warfare not only fabricated empire, but also contributed to the construction of gender, ethnic and 
racial identities so crucial to imperialism as models of differentiation and subordination.  
In this paper I will focus on the British military in the Seven Years’ War, a seminal period in 
Anglo-American history, when the British Empire came of age, and the seeds were sown for anti-
imperialist revolts by Native Americans and American colonists.  I shall address the war from 
three perspectives:  military revolution and the imperial state; the military labor process (what 
my colleague Larry McDonnell and I call warwork); and the subordination of indigenous and 
settler populations, as well as the discourses of difference that facilitated the resulting colonial 
condition.  
 
Military Revolution and the Accumulative Imperial State 
Michael Duffy observed that, “the governments of Ancien Régime Europe were really giant war-
making machines devoting their main efforts to the maintenance of large armed forces.”ii  This 
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situation arose in relation to the so-called military revolution, a concept pioneered by Michael 
Roberts in 1955 (which he centered on the years 1560-1660).  Much of the writing on the 
military revolution absorbs itself with discussions of how advances in military science and 
technology resulted in an escalation of the scale of warfare and the involvement of state and 
society in war making.iii  Geoffrey Parker updated and globalized the concept, arguing that 
fortification, firepower, and swelling numbers of armies comprised of the revolution allowed 
western powers to dominate the world.iv  While there is debate on the exact timing of the military 
revolution, there is broad agreement on its importance.v 
The military revolution idea also addresses the impact of the escalation in armed conflict on 
modern state formation.vi  The new requirements of warfare caused political changes leading to 
the development of the modern state in the eighteenth century, and laying the foundations of 
economic development.  The growth in the size and professionalism of standing armies in the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries—increasing tenfold in just 200 yearsvii—necessitated an 
expansion in the state apparatus to maintain and finance the military.   The state emerged to 
service the military and the military waxed in strength to protect the nurturing state, a 
relationship that in most cases led to absolutist rule and the privileging of a military caste.  
England constituted an exception, most argue, managing both to maintain powerful combined 
military and naval forces, and to develop the most liberal of governing systems.viii 
John Brewer refutes the view that the military was not a dominant force in British society.  
Instead, he proposes the model of  “the fiscal-military state,”  by which he means a state whose 
main function is to wage war and whose fiscal policy and administrative apparatus is geared to 
that end. According to Brewer:  “War was an economic as well as a military activity:  its causes, 
conduct and consequences as much a matter of money as martial prowess.”ix  From the late 17th 
through the 18th centuries Britain would wage war repeatedly with France and her allies, with 
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Britain’s army and navy growing by 300 percent.  The state also had to construct a support 
infrastructure.x  Needless to say, it entailed great expense.  Military spending accounted for 10-
15% of national income during major wars.xi Britain was able to fund its expanding military 
commitments by sharply increasing taxation, engaging in “public deficit finance (a national 
debt)” in an unprecedented fashion, and creating an administrative structure for military and 
fiscal needs.xii  The Treasury emerged after the Restoration as the controlling body over 
government expenditure and tax collection, particularly of customs, excise and the land tax.xiii  
Other than tax collection, the utilization of public debt constituted the other key to funding 
the fiscal-military state.  Public debt in this period transformed from short-term debt to long-term 
borrowing.  Debt rose quickly during war, meaning often a discounting of government bills, thus 
making it harder to secure credit.  The solution was to convert this short-term liability to long-
term funded debt in the form of interest-bearing stocks to be paid for from indirect taxes (i.e. 
customs, excise and stamp duties) determined by parliament.xiv  Thus, from 1688-1714, the 
British state transformed into a fiscal-military state with elevated taxation, sophisticated 
government administration, a standing army, and the desire to be a major European power.xv  
The literature on the military revolution, for all its differences, agrees on the central role of 
war in the formation of states.  A strong tendency exists to treat warfare as a closed loop of 
advances in military technique and technology and corollary state development.  From one 
perspective, the military revolution arises sui generis, cultured by the battlefield and logistical 
needs.  From another, state formation precipitates martial innovation through its defense 
requirements.  Yet both posit a process that operates at a level divorced from the main historical 
actors—the soldiers—and in some instances from the social and economic transformations 
making Europe modern, nor does the imperial setting receive much attention.xvi  Yet the fiscal-
military state derived in large part from colonial sources.  England’s exploration and settlement 
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of new territories necessitated military support, fuelling growth in armies and navies that 
required unprecedented amounts of capital, which colonial trade provided through customs 
collection and taxation of the wealth generated, while the state apparatus grew in size and 
activity as a means of managing the military, trade and colonies.xvii Not only did the fiscal-
military state have its roots in the colonies, it would reach its logical fulfillment there in the form 
of militarily dominated dependencies productive of the economic resources requisite to the 
perpetuation of the fiscal-military state at home.  Towards this end, Britain exported the military 
revolution to the New World, with the Seven Years’ War the sea changing event. 
Historians have characterized the empire in the 17th and 18th centuries as commercial in 
nature, a broad and loosely connected mercantile market ultimately made more systematic by 
what Daniel Baugh calls Britain’s “blue-water” policy.  The main tenets of this policy were:  the 
defense of Britain received first priority; naval control of the English Channel and the North Sea 
constituted the basic military objective; trade and shipping were the keys to paying for defense 
and providing the infrastructure to naval prowess; and colonies were important insomuch as they 
contributed to trade.xviii  The "Atlantic system" that began to take shape under this blue-water 
policy required a large navy and a growing bureaucracy to pay for it by managing taxation. 
Baugh calls this empire a "maritime-imperial system" in that it was based on maritime commerce 
rather than the acquisition of new territories.xix  
Britain’s policy had always been to allow the colonies largely to defend themselves, valuing 
them more for their exports than their territories, and relying on the Royal Navy to keep the sea 
lanes of commerce clear for the flow of commodities.xx  Anemic bodies of troops were placed at 
vital nodal points in the American colonies, and in times of emergency could be fleshed out by 
calling out the militia, or, if absolutely necessary, dispatching modest infusions of regular 
soldiers.  But the stakes of empire building had risen by the mid-18th century, involving control 
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of the American interior, its crucial resources, land and furs, and indigenous peoples. It was at 
this point that the military landscape of North America, in fact British colonial policy and the 
nature of the Empire, began to change.  The prior state of affairs, in which colonies and 
proprietorial companies were expected largely to manage and pay for their own defense would be 
supplanted by an imperial policy whereby standing armies in the colonies would perform these 
duties in a fashion that was more answerable to political officials in London.  The army’s red 
coat would become a more striking signifier of imperial rule than the navy’s blue jacket.  
The Seven Years’ War constituted an important catalyst to these processes.xxi The War 
marked a significant turning point in the nature of Empire from being distinctly commercial to 
being increasingly territorial. xxii  Two decisions undergirded this transformation:  the 
unprecedented commitment of tens of thousands of troops to the American theater; and the 
stationing of a standing army in North America at war’s end to protect the new acquisitions. The 
army was an essential player in the winning of this territorial empire, and the empire was 
increasingly dependent on the army for its defense.  The military revolution that had transformed 
European warfare and the nature of the state was exported to the New World.  In terms of the 
numbers of troops mobilized, the scale of combat, and the massive investment in army supply 
and building of military infrastructure, this was warfare as yet unseen in the Americas.  With the 
Seven Years’ War, Britain’s “military-fiscal state” became territorially imperialistic.   
Thus, Lawrence Gipson a half century ago accurately denoted this conflict the Great War for 
the Empire,xxiii but whereas he emphasized Britain’s altruism in its defense of fellow Britons 
from the French threat, from our vantage point the war can be more clearly distinguished as an 
attempt to advance English power through the expansion of the British Empire, making it more 
exactly a great war for empire.  The Seven Years’ War principally concerned the acquisition of 
territories, raw materials, peoples, and markets in the Americas, in India and on the west coast of 
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Africa; that is the primitive accumulation of economic resources that would make England the 
leading industrial producer for the next century and more.  
 
Common Soldiers 
Traditional imperial history tends to be written from above on such topics as governance, war, 
and trade policy, whereas the new imperial history adopts a subaltern approach, centering on 
indigenous peoples, slaves, transported Europeans, and imperial cultural products.xxiv  Soldiers, I 
argue, provide a link between such histories from above and below, as they are both instruments 
and objects of imperial authority.  As members of armies engaged in warfare of acquisition and 
defense, builders of forts and members of garrison enforcing British sovereignty, they were the 
myrmidons of expansive commercial and territorial imperialism founded upon the expropriation 
of land and labor, production and distribution of staple commodities, and consumption of 
finished goods within an international market.  As individuals enticed or enjoined from diverse 
ethnic and economic backgrounds into an occupation ripe with danger and jacketed with 
restricting discipline, soldiers were expropriated labor yoked to imperial design, alienated from 
civil society, and bracketed at the bottom of the social structure.  
For all the attention focused on civil/martial interstices as well as the social life of common 
soldiers, the new military history has done little on the subject of soldiers as workers.xxv  By the 
mid-eighteenth century, soldiers were drawn from early capitalist societies where paid labor was 
increasingly common.  Their class experience thus began before enlistment, but it is with 
mobilization that their formation as military labor begins.   The regular army in America peaked 
at 23 regiments, or roughly 25,000 regulars in 1761, a quite sizable military force mostly 
composed of recent recruits.   Enlisting meant joining the ranks of wage laborers.  For those that 
came from the land or the crafts, it was a true experience of losing the means of production; even 
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for those entering from another form of paid labor, it usually meant induction to a more exacting 
form of work.  The British army in the Seven Years’ War was made up not primarily of 
professional soldiers, but by ordinary people drawn from their homes either through dwindling 
opportunity there or by the lure of the bounty money secured with enlistment.  Army recruits 
brought with them skills and notions of customary obligations imbedded in economic exchange, 
as well as a tradition of plebeian resistance to perceived incursions on customary rights.  
Once on the job as soldiers they encountered a form of wage work that involved its own labor 
processes and social relations of production. A troop’s martial labor comprised training in the 
skills of soldiering, and applying those skills in defensive and aggressive situations such as 
digging entrenchments and fighting itself.  Warfare’s basic objective entailed killing one's 
opponent.  Wounds and death were also the wages of war for soldiers.  Alienation in this instance 
meant not only a metaphorical loss of selfhood, but for many actual physical loss or negation.  
Yet, combat was but one aspect of a soldier's working life.  More routine were the many 
"fatigues" required to keep a fighting machine functioning.  Troops cleared sites for camps, dug 
trenches and latrines, laid roads, cut wood for palisades, erected fortifications and barracks and 
cleaned grounds—the building materials of empire—receiving in return a wage of 8d. per diem, 
which had been set in 1660 and remained at this level until the late eighteenth century.xxvi  
Soldiers also performed civil labor—cutting wood, hunting for food, harvesting crops, hauling 
provisions—warranting extraordinary payments.  The army also required many types of skilled 
work and men from with ranks with past experience as tailors, shoemakers and weavers all found 
work servicing the army.  The pay for both common and skilled labor varied for much of the 
War, but tended to be 6d. per day for common labor and 1s. for skilled work, more than matching 
their income as soldiers.   
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The shared experience of military labor, not to mention the cohesion drummed into a fighting 
force, produced social integration, making for subaltern garrison communities, both separate 
from and intertwined with the military power structure.xxvii  Separated from society into a 
demimonde of barracks, military camps and garrisons, living and fighting together, dressed in the 
same clothing and sharing the same food, troops developed their own active social life defined by 
commonplace transactions of shared toil and after-hours conviviality.xxviii 
Soldiers did not uniformly compose garrison and camp communities, which acquired trains 
of people dependent upon or profiting from the military:  women and children, family to the 
troop; colonial laborers, contractors, petty merchants, chaplains, scouts and rangers; and Native 
Americans.  However, the military was a male-dominated sphere, the sexual demographic in the 
army always grossly weighted toward men.  The age demographic likewise deviated from 
mainstream society, with young single males dominating.  When forged to soldiers’ violent 
mission, reinforced by the prevalence of weapons, and inflamed by a surfeit of alcohol, this sex-
age orientation impregnated camps with violence.  Soldier society also distinguished itself from 
most settled civilian communities by its transient nature.  Social interaction occurred across time 
and space, as the very dynamic of wartime military life in an imperial setting necessitated 
mobility, making for ephemeral community life.  It is not surprising, then, that, as well as 
camaraderie, conviviality, and a modicum of domesticity, camp culture also hosted alcohol 
abuse, violence and criminality, making for a volatile social mix.  The very organization of the 
military—into messes, companies, battalions, regiments—nonetheless produced a sense of 
belonging to groups that ameliorated the social peculiarities of martial life. 
Yet the army constituted a hierarchical power structure that wielded extensive authority over 
most aspects of its men’s lives.  Soldiers came from the common people, whereas those 
commanding hailed from middling people, the gentry and nobles.  As orders generally applied to 
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living and working conditions, provision of food and shelter, and actual physical well-being, 
class conflict naturally fructified.  Military discipline also functioned as work discipline, and 
undisciplined behavior on the part of soldiers embodied resistance to that discipline.  While the 
military's emphasis on obedience reinforced the deference expected of laboring people, 
soldiering also bred a strong sense of fraternity, a camaraderie forged by the nature of their work 
and the unequal power relationships structuring it, which the issuing of orders and enforcement 
of discipline by superiors daily reiterated.  Thus, by grappling with their subordination, soldiers 
approached a sense of shared identity, an incipient class consciousness.xxix They accommodated 
themselves to their difficult life by following orders, but also by drinking, carousing, fighting, 
and thieving.  They resisted by shirking their duties, disobeying orders, petitioning against 
improper treatment, refusing to work, deserting, and mutinying.  Insubordination pervaded the 
eighteenth century army and collective action periodically threatened.  This class struggle 
reached its apogee in the wake of the war when the army’s attempt to redefine the terms of the 
military labor contract resulted in a general mutiny that spanned the British possessions in North 
America, making for pervasive subaltern resistance in the truest sense of the term. 
 
The Colonial Condition 
Warfare impacts culturally as much as politically or economically, military conflict being a 
crucible of social identity.  Established normative views guide the movement to war and shape 
the social construction of the army, while the resulting cultural interaction gives rise to new or 
altered understandings of other groups.   This interaction took place on a number of planes in the 
Seven Years’ War, as Europeans, Euro-Americans, and Native Americans, women as well as 
men, made and broke connections, as culture war paralleled armed conflict. 
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The army was built upon patriarchal assumptions about social order.  First, it operated within 
entrenched lines of gender expectations, with soldiering deemed a male occupation by nature and 
warfare an elevated test of manhood.  Women did not factor into military logic or, ideally, 
practice.  Military history has subconsciously accepted this gendered logic, and there has been 
little exploration of the ways in which notions of gender have impacted on warfare and molded 
camp life.  This neglect is surprising given the fact that, despite the marked variability of both 
gender models and forms of warfare over time and between cultures, a universal gendering of 
war is apparent: almost without exception men have done the fighting in wars, while women 
have been relegated to spectators, victims, or, at most, military support roles.xxx  This reality, the 
designation of warfare as a masculine pursuit, is the constitutive aspect of war’s engendering.  
Masculinity and femininity are related less to the actual implied physiologies of men and women, 
however, than to what they constitute with regard to the “military mandate.”  The military’s 
unique nature as an apparatus of state-sponsored killing leads to its separation from civilian 
society.  Its members are distinguished from the general population, a collective aggressive 
character cultivated, and their special mission elevated over individual or civilian interests.  This 
process of physical and normative severance is informed and validated by gender discourse, with 
masculinity collapsed with the military and femininity with the civilian (or enemy).  In this way, 
the violence essential to warfare is naturalized and enabled.xxxi The military thus is not invested 
in gender distinctions primarily to privilege men over women, but appropriates such ideological 
privileging to facilitate the large-scale violence deemed so crucial the interests of the state.  In the 
Seven Years’ War, therefore, gender differentiation was marshaled to the cause of vanquishing 
the French and establishing a grander territorial empire. 
The army also sought to entrench gender difference within the camps.  Conceiving of the 
feminine as corrupting of discipline and parasitical of resources, the army downplayed the 
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existence of women, as their presence in this masculine world did not make sense within 
contemporary understandings of gender, a denial that has pervaded much military history.  
Acting on this conception, officers sought to limit strictly the number of women who could 
officially attach themselves to the regiments and to police those women who on their own accord 
followed the camps.  Such actions suppressed the female presence but never came close to 
creating the ideal homosocial universe of masculine warlike endeavor.  For the reality was that 
the army depended upon women to perform a range of service functions, such as nursing and 
laundressing, which enabled the reproduction of warfare.xxxii 
Not only did gender notions provide a means of severing military men from society, but also, 
models of family governance, particularly the relationship of father and son, supplied a ready-
made language of natural subordination.  Officers constituted the patriarchs, soldiers the 
dependent children and servants of the domestic unit subjugated thoroughly to the will of their 
paternal commanders.  The patriarchal army articulated the chain of command in terms of this 
discourse both as a means to reinforce discipline, but also to classify soldiers as other than civil 
beings, in this way denying them certain rights and subjecting them to a different legal code, 
making them dependents stripped of individual will, thus ideal soldiers better prepared to engage 
in deadly armed combat.  Legitimization for their subordination came from treating them as 
perennially young males who had not achieved their majority.  The reward for soldiers came in 
the form of a masculinity of heroic dimension ascribed to them.   Manliness comprised the 
psychological wage granted soldiers who in reality were largely denied most other things that 
defined a man in this period—a certain freedom of sexual expression, unhindered family life, 
economic independence, and spatial mobility.  Patriarchal norms thus were appropriated both to 
separate men from mainstream heterosocial society to create a “gender” or “class” of soldiers, 
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and to subject male warriors to a hierarchical command structure naturalized by the age and rank 
hierarchies imbedded in partriarchy. 
Ethnic or national identities, more malleable than gender, take shape and form alloys in the 
heat of battle.  Current theory in ethnic studies stresses the social construction of ethnicity, seen 
as arising from cultural interaction with other groups, often through emigration experience. 
Warfare is another determinative process in the construction of ethnic identities.  One needs the 
“other” to wage war with psychological release from the taboo of murder, while hierarchies of 
ethnic types facilitate the assertion of dominance over dependent peoples so necessary in the 
imperial setting.  Regional, cultural, linguistic, and religious particularities—the baggage of 
ethnicity—have always functioned as means of such differentiation.xxxiii Conversely, new 
synthetic identities can be minted to integrate a fighting force and construct nouveau imperial 
identities. Mobilizing the army to fight the Seven Years’ War entailed drawing people together 
from different countries or regions with varying social and religious norms into a polyglot, 
culturally heterogeneous whole.  The patriotic idea of the Briton, a faux consciousness, emerged 
as a concept meant to integrate what was in fact a heterogeneous citizenry composed in part of 
Scots and Irish, peoples themselves forcibly wedded to the English state by warfare.  In these 
ways, the army wielded ethnic identification as a dual-edged weapon within the larger struggle to 
create a territorial empire for the imperial state. 
Within the military different nationalities both mixed freely and, particularly in the case of 
Highland Scots and Germans, collected into ethnic clusters that sought to perpetuate native 
identities.  The English born accounted for under a third of the North American regular army, 
with Scots and Irish each just slightly less in number, while continental Europeans constituted a 
twentieth.  Colonists made up five per cent of their numbers in 1757, while foreign-born 
residents of America constituted just slightly more.xxxiv  This distribution usually did not apply 
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on the regimental basis, as few regiments had an even spread of ethnic groups, and particular 
ethnic groups clearly dominated certain regiments, with the Scots offering the clearest evidence 
for ethnic clustering.xxxv Whether interacting with different types of people, or celebrating one’s 
own ethnic identity, as in the celebrations attending St. George’s and St. Patrick’s days, 
discourses of difference were constructed or reinforced.  Little evidence exists pointing to the 
creation of an overarching soldier identity as a “Briton.”  The war’s effect involved, more so, the 
creation of imperial identities.  A dominant Britishness purports an internal integrity to the 
Empire that did not in fact exist.  At the same time, England needed subordinate national 
identities, both to include in the imperial project undeniably distinct peoples, but also to remind 
these colonized peoples that they remained apart from the English, who subordinated and 
incorporated them into the Kingdom or Empire, and who remained their cultural and political 
superiors.  
The other allies with whom the army had closest contact were the American colonists.  
Historians have long pointed to the friction that developed between the army and colonial 
assemblies and citizens alike during the war as an important component in the development of an 
American national character.xxxvi   Tensions were generated over such issues as the induction of 
indentured servants into the service, quartering of troops, provisioning of the army, and disputes 
over the rank of provincial army officers in relation to regular officers.  The matter of recruiting 
particularly rankled colonials.  The army enlisted servants, apprentices and craftsmen at the 
expense of masters, while the recruiting of free men distorted the colonial labor market.  
Ostensibly un-tethered workers, recruits tended to be young men with important familial and 
community ties, with economic responsibilities to parents or employers, and enlistment in the 
regulars usually meant a loss of their labor to these networks for years.  One should not overstate 
these differences, though, as Pitt’s promise to cover much of the colonial expenses and the series 
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of army victories dating from 1758 did much to soothe British-American tensions. Nonetheless, 
there is no doubting the fact that “British” and “American” soldiers viewed one another as 
different, which cultured affairs in the broader imperial relationship in which the army, as the 
overarching British governing structure during the war, played a central role.  The real beginning 
of the rupture between the two dates to the end of the war, however, and Parliamentary decisions 
taken on how to deal with the newly enlarged empire.   Colonial revolt would form but the most 
prominent current in a wave of subaltern resistance against the now militant empire. 
Imperial expansion inevitably brought the British army into contact with aboriginal 
peoples.xxxvii  The Seven Years’ War involved a struggle over who would control North 
America’s wealth.  Indians were intimately involved in the conflict, fighting for their own 
interests, allying to one or the other of the European powers, and even when remaining neutral.  
Their war was not about empire-building but was fought to, at the least, maintain the status quo 
ante, a delicate balance of British, French, Euro-American and Amerindian interests, from which 
the later derived significant benefit. Until the French were vanquished, Indians could not be 
ignored or pushed aside by either Europeans or their colonists.  They were essential commercial 
and martial partners, who must be courted and given all due consideration. 
On an institutional level, the army, as the main broker of state policy, sought to maintain 
formal relations with the natives.  This involved establishing political/military alliances and trade 
connections that were inevitably infused by cultural stereotyping. More personally, soldier 
encountered warrior as ally and enemy, and this led to both social intermingling and brutal 
bloodletting. There is no doubting the feelings of difference that each felt for the other, but still 
communication between soldiers and Indians took place—conveyed through microbes, drink, 
sex, kinship, and hunting.  Due to the nature of their congress, this being a time of warfare, they 
exchanged military tactics and cultural practices associated with warfare, often cruelly violent, 
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yet elemental human language ripe with promise of commonality and cooperation. With interests 
at root opposed to each other’s, it is no wonder that miscommunication and conflict frequently 
emerged between the British military and Indian tribes.  The mutual misunderstanding was only 
translated into a discourse of British dominance and Native dependence at war’s end, however, 
when the defeat of the French and Spanish robbed them of alternative European allies, upsetting 
the diplomatic fulcrum upon which the middle ground acquired leverage, and allowing the 
British to impose upon them a less favorable client-patron relationship.   The Indian war known 
as Pontiac’s Uprising constituted a rejection of this assertion of imperial sovereignty. 
 
 Subaltern Resistance 
At war’s end in 1763,xxxviii British leaders encoded three rules of territorial empire. First, 
indigenous peoples, as dependents of the empire, must not disturb the peace, should engage in 
the production and commercial exchange of staple commodities on market terms.  Second, 
colonists should pay their fair share of colonial administration, particularly self-defense, abide by 
whatever trade and taxation policies Parliament set, and not move into the interior so as to 
encroach on Native lands.  Third, territorial empire, more so than commercial empire, requires a 
military presence, an army that should be paid for out of revenues generated by the colonies, and 
manned by soldiers serving on the same terms as home troops.  Indian war, incipient colonial 
revolt, and general mutiny resulted. 
General Jeffrey Amherst, Commander in Chief of British forces in North America, never at 
ease with Native American combatants, implemented British policy that determined to place 
garrisons in the former French forts in Native lands, restricted trade with Indians to army forts, to 
terminated the trade in firearms and ammunition, and sought to do away with the practice of gift 
giving, instead seeking to impose upon them a more commercial model of economic exchange. 
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This frontal assault on the fundamentals of both diplomatic and economic relations in the middle 
ground war evoked pervasive dissatisfaction from native peoples; allies felt betrayed while 
former enemies resented the assumption that defeat of France somehow gave Britain the right to 
dictate terms.  In the spring of 1763, the so-called Pontiac’s rebellion erupted.  Tribal groups 
throughout the Ohio valley attacked and in most cases captured British posts.  The outcome of 
the Indian War had been all but decided by the end of 1763, as natives suffered from a lack of 
firearms and ammunition, but fighting dragged on into 1765, an indication of their profound 
discontent for the new order of things.xxxix    
Pontiac’s War can be conceived of as a colonialist struggle.  Having lost their long term ally 
France as a result of the Treaty of Paris, these independent indigenous peoples were confronted 
by another European power, Britain, which claimed sovereignty over and stationed military 
garrisons in their lands, and imposed strict new trade relations upon them, all to be mediated 
through the army.  Indians rejected British imperial claims and the vassal status this meant to 
them.   The changing definition of empire was no abstraction to these people, but a threatening 
new political economy manifested in military posts.  Ripping these tendrils of empire out did not 
uproot British imperium, however.  Another colonial uprising resulting in revolution would 
eventually achieve this end, but from the native perspective put in its place an even more 
insidious expansionist power.  
American colonists also soon became alienated from Britain’s postwar imperial settlement.  
Cooperation had marked the last few years of the war, while battlefield success cemented this 
fellow feeling.  But the end of the war removed the basic need of cooperation, and awoke Britain 
to the fact that the massive wartime debt must be paid off.  Furthermore, by choosing the lands of 
former New France over the Caribbean island of Martinique and Guadaloupe, Britain in effect 
opted for territorial over commercial empire, and thus substantially enhanced the extent of 
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possessions to be administered and defended.  London looked to the colonies to pay part of the 
costs.  In 1763, Parliament stated its intention to maintain 20 battalions of regulars in North 
America. To pay for this army, the government decided to apply a stamp tax on the colonies. xl  
Colonists perceived two grave assaults on their rights as Englishmen:  the creation of a standing 
army; and the leveling of a direct tax, without colonial representation in Parliament.   They 
responded by rioting and forming an inter-colonial congress to fight the Stamp Act in a crisis that 
is often seen as the first battle of the rebellion. The decision to station a standing army in the 
colonies marked a shift in thinking about the nature of Empire.  No longer content with the fluid 
bonds of what Daniel Baugh termed a "maritime-imperial system," and determined to exert more 
control over her dominions by enforcing trade and settlement policies, Britain had opted for a 
military-territorial empire.  Despite its imminent failure in the American colonies, this would 
remain the blueprint for global expansion into the 20th century.  Defense of colonial territory and 
enforcement of colonial policy were the military watchwords of the new British Empire. 
As for the unwitting instruments of these policies, the soldiers of the regular army, all was 
not sunny in the new dawn of the postwar era.  Under pressure from the Treasury, the War Office 
moved to create a "New Establishment" by cutting the size of the army and making the 
remaining soldiers bear more of the burden of their support.xli  In particular, the army decided to 
“stop” (or withhold) 4d. of a private’s daily earnings of 6d. to pay for provisions which had been 
freely supplied throughout the War.  But other issues intruded, with the disbanding and reduction 
of regiments, the drafting of soldiers into other regiments, the ending of pay for extraordinary 
labor, concerns over reimbursement for uniforms bought but not issued, and the termination of 
provisioning for soldiers’ wives all playing a part.xlii   Moreover, the hard service and high 
mortality experienced in the West Indian campaigns of 1762 led soldiers to expect a reward and 
return to Britain, rather than reduced earnings and continued colonial exile.  Regular soldiers 
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came from laboring classes experiencing the initial stages of industrialization, many from skilled 
backgrounds, and their experiences as workers, both before enlistment and as paid soldiers, 
informed their response to the changed economic relations imposed upon them by the army at 
war’s end.  Mutiny erupted from Newfoundland to Florida, as regular soldiers took up arms to 
fight against alterations to their wage and work conditions.  As an unnamed soldier of the 60th 
Regiment brazenly proclaimed to the military governor of Quebec, James Murray:  “Better to die 
on a gibbet! than to perish by inches!”xliii  This wave of rebelliousness would force Amherst to 
reduce the wage deductions, placating many of the troops, but mutiny raged on late into the 
spring of 1764.  The mutineers finally yielded, albeit not before extracting further concessions 
from the King. 
 
Conclusion 
Indian war, colonial uprising and military mutiny mark the point at which the British Empire 
became modern, a transformation made possible by the warwork of the Seven Years’ War.  This 
lecture has sought to demonstrate the army's role in the wider history of British imperial 
expansion.  I have tried to provide a fresh reading of what has been called the first truly world-
wide war, to treat the military as a central component of state expansion and to recast warfare as 
a form of economic accumulation, which in this instance connected the merchants of Britain to 
the Euro-American producers of the North American colonies, as well as their servants and 
slaves, and, beyond, to Native American peoples.  Soldiers helped create and defend this 
marketplace of trade, theft, conflict, and social exchange.  They paid the price of Empire by the 
pound of flesh or with the dying breath. 
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